Killed in action (KIA): an analysis of military personnel who died of their injuries before reaching a definitive medical treatment facility in Afghanistan (2004–2014) by Webster, Stacey et al.
This article has been accepted for publication in Accronym not defined in the Dictionary following peer review. 
The definitive copyedited, typeset version is available online at 10.1136/bmjmilitary-2020-001490 
 
Title Page 
 
Killed in Action (KIA): an analysis of military personnel who died of their injuries 
before reaching a definitive medical treatment facility in Afghanistan (2004-2014) 
 
S Webster, EBG Barnard, JE Smith, M Marsden, C Wright 
 
Corresponding Author 
Capt Stacey Webster 
6 Admiral Close, Stoke Park, Bristol, BS16 1WN 
Stacey.webster@doctors.org.uk 
 
Co-authors 
Surgeon Commander Ed Barnard PhD FRCEM FIMC RCSEd Royal Navy 
1. Academic Department of Military Emergency Medicine, Royal Centre for Defence 
Medicine (Research & Academia), Birmingham, UK 
2.  Emergency Department, Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, 
Cambridge, UK 
 
Surgeon Captain Jason E Smith Royal Navy 
1. Academic Department of Military Emergency Medicine, Royal Centre for Defence 
Medicine (Research & Academia), Birmingham, United Kingdom 
2. Emergency Department, University Hospitals Plymouth NHS Trust, Plymouth, UK 
 
Major Max Marsden RAMC 
1. Academic Department of Military Surgery and Trauma, Royal Centre for Defence 
Medicine (Research & Academia), Birmingham, UK 
2. Centre for Trauma Sciences, Blizard Institute, Queen Mary University of London, London, 
UK 
 
Colonel Chris Wright L/RAMC 
1. Academic Department of Military Emergency Medicine, Royal Centre for Defence 
Medicine (Research & Academia), Birmingham, United Kingdom 
 
Keywords 
Military, Pre-hospital, Trauma 
 
Word count 3310 
 
Contributorship 
SW & CW initiated the idea, collected the data, analysed the results, wrote and reviewed the 
paper. 
EB analysed the results, wrote and reviewed the paper. 
MM & JS wrote and reviewed the paper. 
 
Funding 
No external funding has been received  
 
Competing interests 
No competing interests to declare 
 
Study approval 
Approval for this study has been granted by defence 
 
 
  
Key Messages (4-6 sentences each of no more than 25 words should describe the key 
points) 
 
1.  87% of UK deaths in Afghanistan were pre-hospital. 
2.  Over half of the KIA deaths were immediate, and two-thirds occurred within ten minutes 
of injury. 
3.  A primary injury to the head had a significantly shorter time to death compared to the 
abdomen and to the lower extremity. 
4.  Significant improvement in survival can be attributed to a reduction in the pre-hospital 
case fatality rate (CFR) without an increase in the in-hospital CFR. 
 
  
Abstract 
 
Introduction 
The majority of combat deaths occur before arrival at a medical treatment facility but no 
previous studies have comprehensively examined this phase of care.  
 
 
Methods 
The UK Joint Theatre Trauma Registry (JTTR) was used to identify all UK military 
personnel who died in Afghanistan (2004-2014).  These data were linked to non-medical 
tactical and operational records to provide an accurate timeline of events. Cause of death was 
determined from records taken at post mortem review. The primary objective was to report 
time between injury and death in those Killed in Action (KIA); secondary objectives 
included: reporting mortality at key NATO timelines (0, 10, 60, 120mins), comparison of 
temporal lethality for different anatomical injuries, and analysing trends in the case fatality 
rate (CFR). 
 
Results 
2413 UK personnel were injured in Afghanistan from 2004-2014; 448 died, with a CFR of 
18.6%.  390 (87.1%) of these died pre-hospital (n=348 KIA, n=42 KNEA). Complete data 
were available for n=303 (87.1%) KIA: Median ISS 75.0 [IQR 55.5-75.0]. The predominant 
mechanisms were IED (n=166, 54.8%) and GSW (n=96, 31.7%).   
 
In the KIA cohort, the median time to death was 0.0 [IQR 0.0-21.8] minutes; 173 (57.1%) 
died immediately (zero minutes). At 10, 60, and 120mins post-injury, 205 (67.7%), 277 
(91.4%) and 300 (99.0%) casualties were dead respectively.  Whole body primary injury had 
the fastest mortality. Overall pre-hospital CFR improved throughout the period whilst in 
hospital CFR remained constant. 
 
Conclusion 
Over two-thirds of KIA deaths occurred within 10mins of injury. Improvement in the case 
fatality rate in Afghanistan was predominantly in the pre-hospital phase.  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Most fatalities from trauma, in civilian and military settings, die before reaching a medical 
treatment facility (MTF).[1,2] Paradoxically, this is the least researched and understood 
phase of care. It is accepted that the sooner a patient reaches definitive medical care, the 
better the outcome from severe trauma.[3] This has been appreciated for several decades of 
military conflict, and underpins the concept of MTFs being located as far forward as possible 
to minimise the time to definitive care.  In recent conflicts, life-saving interventions such as 
pre-hospital emergency anaesthesia, blood transfusion, and surgical procedures (for example  
thoracotomy) were pushed forward into the pre-hospital environment. These interventions, 
combined with senior decision making, were used to good effect in the recent conflict in 
Afghanistan.[4,5] These advances in pre-hospital care have also been adopted in civilian 
practice, and are associated with improved early mortality.[6]  
 
Historically, death due to trauma was thought to follow a tri-modal distribution.[7] However, 
more recently this has been questioned, with many challenging the validity of this model in a 
modern trauma system.[8-10] Similarly, the ‘Golden Hour’ is a widely understood concept 
that describes the first hour following injury as the optimal period to intervene with life-
saving intervention, and this has been used to drive improvement in the initial management of 
trauma patients and indeed the entire trauma pathway. However, the 60 minutes of the 
‘Golden Hour’ are not based on robust evidence. It is not known how quickly life-saving 
intervention is needed in patients with time-critical potentially fatal injuries.   
 
Operation HERRICK was the UK’s contribution to the conflict in Afghanistan between 
2002-2014. Survival from a given injury severity improved year on year throughout the 
course of the conflict but further analysis is necessary to define where these benefits 
occurred.[5] It has been suggested that in order to improve future survival rates, we should 
focus on the Died of Wounds cohort,[11] but most fatalities occurred pre-hospital and 
therefore these patients could hold the greatest potential for improving survival.  
 
Research in this area is inherently difficult to conduct, with the majority of existing evidence 
and data analyses focussing on patients after arrival at hospital. Previous analyses of 
casualties who die before arrival at a MTF, or who subsequently die of their wounds, have 
not included any detail on the time it takes for patients to die from battlefield injury.[1,11,12] 
This remains a poorly researched area that may provide some evidence to support 
recommendations and timelines in pre-hospital emergency care. Eastridge identified this as 
an unexploited blind spot in the epidemiology of battlefield injuries, which is integral to 
improving future mortality.[13] 
 
The primary aim of this study was to define the time interval between injury and death in UK 
military personnel who were Killed in Action (KIA) during Op HERRICK.  The secondary 
aims were to: a) compare the time to death for the most prevalent primary anatomical 
injuries; b) report mortality at key NATO timelines (0, 10, 60, 120mins); and c) analyse 
overall, pre-hospital, and in-hospital mortality rates during Op HERRICK. 
 
 
 
  
METHODS 
 
The UK Joint Trauma Theatre Registry (JTTR) contains data on all UK service personnel 
that were injured who either activated a trauma team in a deployed MTF, or who died of their 
injuries. The JTTR was searched to identify all UK service personnel who died in 
Afghanistan during Op HERRICK between 2004–2014. Cause of death was determined from 
records made at post mortem examination. If casualties were multiply injured their primary 
cause of death was used for analysis.  
 
JTTR does not include accurate time of death data for casualties who died before arrival at an 
MTF.  Therefore, the JTTR was cross-referenced with tactical and operational (non-medical) 
logs to develop a comprehensive database that included accurate timeline data.  Time of pre-
hospital death was defined as loss of a central pulse or the start of cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation.  Other key definitions are in Table 1.   
 
Table 1: Key definitions 
 
Abbreviation Definition 
Killed in Action (KIA) Injured as a result of enemy action, died before arrival at hospital 
Died of Wounds 
(DOW) 
Injured as a result of enemy action, died after arrival at hospital 
Killed Non-Enemy 
Action (KNEA) 
Injured as a result of non-enemy action, died before arrival at 
hospital 
Died Non-Enemy 
Action (DNEA) 
Injured as a result of non-enemy action, died after arrival at 
hospital 
Case Fatality Rate 
(CFR) 
Number of deaths / total number of those injured; reported as a 
percentage. 
 
Body regions are recorded within JTTR.[11] For clarity, ‘lower extremity’ includes pelvis, 
and ‘whole body’ is defined as: massive, multiple organ injury to thorax and/or abdomen 
with loss of one or more limbs and/or decapitation. 
 
 
 
Data analysis 
 
Data were collated in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, and analysed in Prism 8 for macOS 
(GraphPad Software, San Diego, CA, USA, v8.3.0).  Descriptive data are presented as n (%) 
and median [inter-quartile range].   
 
Comparisons of proportions at fixed time points (for example the proportion of ‘whole body’ 
casualties dead at zero minutes compared to the proportion of ‘head’ casualties dead at zero 
minutes) were undertaken with a two-tailed Fisher’s exact test.  Significance was pre-defined 
as p<0.05, and corrected for multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni method (0.05/K, 
where K is defined as the total number of comparisons).  
 
The time to death (survival curve) between different primary injuries was analysed with a 
two-tailed Gehan-Breslow-Wilcoxon test.  This test gives more weight to earlier deaths than 
a Logrank test,[14] which is important when comparing rates of mortality after injury.  
Overall significance (testing the hypothesis that all survival curves are identical) was pre-
defined as p<0.05.  For between-group comparisons, the significance threshold was corrected 
using the Bonferroni method. 
 
In order to analyse differences in CFR throughout the study period, the proportion of deaths 
were compared between the first and last year of data in a) the overall CFR, b) the pre-
hospital CFR, and c) in the in-hospital CFR with a two-tailed Fisher’s exact test.  To provide 
direction and an estimate of magnitude and precision, a Baptista-Pike odds ratio was reported 
alongside the Fisher’s p-value, and has been reported as OR (95% confidence interval 
(95%CI)).  A chi-square test for trend was then applied to each group, and a p-value <0.05 
indicates a significant linear trend over time. 
 
Ethical review 
 
Anonymised data were supplied from the JTTR, and according to institutional agreement, 
ethical approval was not required. Permission to use post mortem data was obtained from the 
Oxfordshire Senior Coroner.  The project was registered with the Academic Department of 
Military Emergency Medicine at the Royal Centre for Defence Medicine, Birmingham, UK – 
reference number: ADMEM2020/0001.  
RESULTS 
 
A total of 2413 UK service personnel were injured during Op HERRICK (2004-2014).  Army 
personnel accounted for the largest number of injured n=2051 (85.0%); followed by Royal 
Marines n=261 (10.8%); Royal Air Force (RAF) n=89 (3.7%); and Royal Navy n=12 (0.5%).  
During this period, 448 personnel died; an overall CFR of 18.6%.  
 
Of the 448 deaths, 87.1% died pre-hospital (KIA & KNEA), (Figure 1).  The predominant 
mechanisms of injury in the KNEA group were aircraft incidents (n=20) and motor vehicle 
collisions (n=10) – these deaths are not described further.  Complete timeline data were 
available for n=303 (87.1%) of those KIA, which forms the definitive cohort for further 
analyses (Figure 1). 
 
KIA cohort 
 
These 303 personnel had a median injury severity score (ISS) of 75.0 [55.5-75.0].  The 
predominant mechanism of injury was improvised explosive device (IED) n=166 (54.8%), 
followed by gunshot wound (GSW) n=96 (31.7%); explosive (non-IED, for example mine / 
grenade) n=40 (13.2%); and a single death from an aircraft incident.   
 
The most prevalent primary injury was head, followed by thorax, and lower extremity.  
‘Whole body’ injury was reported in n=21 (one was injured in an aircraft incident and the 
remainder were injured by IED) (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: The time interval between injury and death in UK casualties with complete 
timeline data who were killed in action during Op HERRICK 
 
 Time interval between injury and death / minutes (n (%))  
Region Immediate 1-10 11-60 61-120 >120 
Overall  
n (%) 
Head 83 (48.0%) 13 (40.6%) 23 (31.9%) 4 (17.4%) 1 (33.3%) 124 (40.9%) 
Thorax 29 (16.8%) 6 (18.8%) 13 (18.1%) 9 (39.1%) 0 57 (18.8%) 
Lower extremity 11 (6.4%) 1 (3.1%) 16 (22.2%) 6 (26.1%) 0 34 (11.2%) 
Neck 16 (9.2%) 6 (18.8%) 5 (6.9%) 0 0 27 (8.9%) 
Abdomen 9 (5.2%) 5 (15.6%) 11 (15.3%) 1 (4.3%) 1 (33.3%) 27 (8.9%) 
Whole body 22 (12.7%) 1 (3.1%) 0 0 0 23 (7.6%) 
Spine 3 (1.7%) 0 3 (4.2%) 2 (8.7%) 1 (33.3%) 9 (3.0%) 
Face 0 0 0 1 0 1 (0.3%) 
Upper extremity 0 0 1 0 0 1 (0.3%) 
Total (n (%)) 173 (57.1%) 32 (10.6%) 72 (23.8%) 23 (7.6%) 3 (1.0%) 303 
 The median time between injury and death was 0.0 [0.0-21.8] minutes.  At 10, 60, and 120 
minutes post-injury, n=205 (67.7%), n=277 (91.4%) and n=300 (99.0%) casualties were 
dead, respectively (Figure 2).  Three KIA deaths occurred >120 minutes post-injury: at 133, 
144, and 221 minutes (Table 2). 
 
Immediate deaths 
 
In 173 (57.1%) cases, death was immediate (recorded as zero minutes); head was the most 
prevalent injury (Table 2).  The immediate mortality of the top six anatomical injury regions 
listed in Table 2 were compared – a total of 15 comparisons, resulting in a significance 
threshold of p<0.0034.  The highest immediate mortality was observed in the ‘whole body’ 
group (95.7%), significantly higher than neck (p=0.0029), thorax (p=0.84 x10
-4
), abdomen 
(p=0.48 x10
-5
), and lower extremity (p=0.12 x10
-5
) groups.  The second highest immediate 
mortality was observed in the head group (66.9%), significantly higher than abdomen 
(p=0.0019), and lower extremity (p=0.0004) groups.  There were no significant differences in 
the proportion of immediate death between the other anatomical regions examined (Figure 3). 
 
Analysis of time to death for different primary injuries 
 
Survival curve analysis was undertaken for the top six anatomical injury regions listed in 
Table 2 and illustrated in Figure 3; the corrected significance threshold was p<0.0034.  The 
survival curves were significantly different, p=0.91 x10
-5
.  In individual comparisons, there 
were statistical differences in survival between: 1) ‘whole body’ and thorax (p=0.0004), 
abdomen (p=0.12 x10
-4
), and lower extremity (p=0.23 x10
-5
) groups; and 2) between head 
and abdomen (p=0.0020), and lower extremity (p=0.46 x10
-4
) groups.  There were no other 
significant differences in survival between the groups examined (Figure 3). 
 
Changes in CFR over time  
 
The CFR during the study period was 18.6% (including all classifications of death). There 
were only n=4 total casualties in 2004 and 2005 and n=35 in 2014, therefore data from 2006 
to 2013 have been used for this analysis. 
 
There was a significant reduction in overall CFR between 2006 and 2013, from 42.9% to 
6.2%: OR 11.3 (95%CI 5.2-25.4), p=0.16 x10
-10
.  These data demonstrated a downward trend 
during the study period, p=0.16 x10
-8
 (Figure 4). 
 
During the same time, there was a significant reduction in pre-hospital CFR, from 41.8% to 
4.8%: OR 14.2 (95%CI 5.9-35.5), p=0.26 x10
-11
, and these data demonstrated a downward 
trend throughout the period, p=0.35 x10
-9
.  There was no apparent change in in-hospital CFR 
between 2006 (1.1%) and 2013 (1.4%): OR 0.77 (95%CI 0.09-11.3), p=1.0; there was no 
linear trend observed in the in-hospital CFR, p=0.48 (Figure 4). 
 
 
 
  
DISCUSSION 
 
This study has shown that over half (57.1%) of UK pre-hospital deaths in Afghanistan 2004-
2014 were immediate. A further 10.6% died within ten minutes of injury; therefore, over two-
thirds died within the first ten minutes, without any realistic opportunity for advanced 
medical intervention. In addition, for the first time, we have demonstrated that different body 
region injuries show different temporal lethality. Whole body and head injuries result in 
significantly faster death than other anatomical regions. Although lower limb injury was a 
less common cause of death, when it is the primary injury it results in slower death that may 
be more amenable to medical intervention. Using novel timeline data, we have demonstrated 
that improvements in overall trauma survival during Op HERRICK were associated with a 
reduction in pre-hospital mortality with no apparent effect on mortality in hospital.  
 
The findings of this study are consistent with existing evidence that the majority of deaths 
following battlefield trauma occur before arrival at hospital.[1] However, this also provides 
granular detail with regard to the timing of death in the early phase of injury. Timelines are of 
particular doctrinal importance to the military, whose pathways of care for injured personnel 
on deployed operations dictate how far away from medical support units conduct offensive 
operations. A balance must be struck between constraining operational missions and 
providing optimal care to ensure survival of injured patients. Current North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) policy involves a 10-1-2 medical element (all casualties should receive 
battlefield first aid within 10 minutes, advanced first aid within one hour, and surgery within 
two hours). As more than two-thirds of deaths occur within the first 10 minutes following 
injury, immediate access to simple but potentially life-saving intervention is an important 
element of the chain of survival. Most modern militaries recognise that immediate first aid is 
key to reducing overall mortality and have responded by equipping and training every soldier 
in basic techniques such as control of catastrophic haemorrhage, so that the treatment of 
every casualty can begin as soon as possible after injury, and the data from this study support 
this. 
 
Previous studies have demonstrated that most preventable trauma deaths occur in the pre-
hospital phase and have suggested that this is where the greatest opportunity for improving 
survival in the most severely injured patients lies.[13] This study also supports this concept, 
as 87% of patients who die from battlefield trauma do so before reaching an MTF. Military 
pre-hospital care covers a broad spectrum of possible interventions that begin at the moment 
of injury, from self-aid to care under fire, buddy aid, care provided by a combat medic all the 
way up to Level 8 (consultant-delivered) advanced pre-hospital care. This entire chain of 
medical care and interventions which has been integral to improving survival during this 
conflict.  
The pre-hospital CFR reduced during the study period but the in-hospital CFR remained 
constant; at first glance this may suggest that no improvement in hospital care was made 
during the period, but as the pre-hospital CFR reduced, more severely injured patients were 
delivered to the hospital, and therefore the fact that there was no discernible change actually 
suggests that over time more severely injured patients had the same chance of survival, as 
eloquently demonstrated previously
5
, suggesting improvements throughout the chain of 
medical care. 
One finding of note was that the case fatality rate has remained similar for over 100 
years.[15-17] This suggests that the lethality of war has matched the pace of medical 
advances. Death from haemorrhage is still the most significant cause of preventable death, 
not only on the battlefield but also in civilian trauma. Improving our understanding of how 
and when these deaths occur shows that the pre-hospital phase is where the lives of future 
soldiers will be saved. Evidence suggests that early haemorrhage control, administration of 
tranexamic acid (TXA) and far forward blood transfusion improve mortality.[3,18-20] Future 
innovations such as the administration of intramuscular TXA through an autoinjector may 
continue to improve outcomes. Resuscitative endovascular balloon occlusion of the aorta 
(REBOA) can be used control haemorrhage and one recent study concluded that one in five 
severely injured casualties were potentially suitable for REBOA,[21] but our study suggests 
that this intervention may not be feasible within the window of opportunity for the majority 
of patients.   
 
While this data analysis reflects a military population, many of the lessons learned from the 
conflict in Afghanistan have been successfully implemented in civilian trauma care. 
Adoption of an end to end trauma system in the UK National Health Service (NHS) has 
resulted in significantly improved mortality.[22] We live in an unstable world with increasing 
numbers of battlefield-type injuries being treated in UK emergency departments, whether that 
be from terrorist incidents,[23] or due to increasing violence on the streets from knife and 
gun crime,[24] and so lessons from this study might be applicable to civilian emergency 
departments.[2] It has also been recognised that in terrorist attacks there is a therapeutic 
vacuum where casualties may die in the hot zone before sufficient medical care can be 
given.[25] Therefore, lessons from the battlefield are increasingly applicable to major 
incident planning and those involved in the trauma care pathway.  
 
This study has several limitations that are inherent to retrospective database review 
methodology, which relies on the accuracy of data within the JTTR. Accurate pre-hospital 
data are notoriously difficult to collect and indeed most studies to date have excluded the pre-
hospital phase of care. The cause of death was difficult to confirm in a number of patients 
due to the complexity of injury, and there was a reliance on post mortem data. The time to 
death data are estimated from several different sources, and therefore come with a margin of 
error. There was incomplete data capture and there were some cases for whom accurate 
timings were not available. Many patients were very severely injured and commonly multiple 
body regions were injured. However, having access to other military data sources has enabled 
the collation of a unique, highly detailed database, which has given us the opportunity to 
analyse with as much certainty as possible what happens in the early stages to critically 
injured trauma patients during conflict.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This study has demonstrated for the first time the mortality timelines of those military 
personnel killed in action, and has defined the temporal lethality of different injury patterns. 
It has shown that over two-thirds of KIA deaths occurred within 10mins of injury, without 
any obvious opportunity to improve survival. Whole body and head primary injury have a 
significantly faster mortality than thorax, abdomen and lower extremity injury. The 
opportunity to further improve combat survival is likely to lie in the pre-hospital phase of 
care and may involve developments in haemorrhage control. Improvement in case fatality 
rate in Afghanistan was predominantly in the pre-hospital phase. The ‘Golden Hour’ should 
not be considered a specific time period, but rather a critical phase of care following injury in 
which life-saving interventions make a difference to survival. 
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Figure Legend 
 
Figure 1 - A CONSORT diagram of UK Service Personnel injured in Afghanistan (2004-
2014) describing the definitive cohort (KIA with complete timeline data).  KIA, killed in 
action; KNEA, killed non-enemy action; DOW, died of wounds; DNEA, died non-enemy 
action. 
 
Figure 2 - Survival curve for n=303 UK Service Personnel who were killed in action in 
Afghanistan (2004-2014).   
 
Figure 3 - Survival curve for n=290 UK Service Personnel who were killed in action in 
Afghanistan (2004-2014) by primary anatomical injury recorded in the UK Joint Theatre 
Trauma Registry. 
 
Figure 4 - Case fatality rate of UK Service Personnel injured in Afghanistan (2006-2013) by 
year.  Plotted as total population, pre-hospital deaths, and in-hospital deaths (data are 
superimposed). 
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